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Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their
workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose
adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong support for
the existence of this dark side. Following surprise director departures, affected firms have worse stock
and operating performance, are more likely to suffer from an extreme negative return event, are more
likely to restate earnings, and have a higher likelihood of being named in a federal class action securities
fraud lawsuit.
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Two of Ford’s non-executive directors have resigned, reviving questions about the carmaker’s stability. 
Sir John Bond, the chairman of Vodafone, and Jorma Ollila, the chairman of Nokia, will leave because 
each “had significant responsibilities within their own companies, and each has recently added new 
responsibilities in advising governmental entities during these difficult economic times,” Ford said on 
Friday.  Sunday Times, October 19, 2008 
 
Corporate governance reforms following the corporate scandals of the turn of the century focused heavily 
on increasing the representation of outside directors on boards. Listing standards on U.S. exchanges were 
changed  to  require  boards  to  have  a  majority  of  outside  directors.  Many  countries  have  introduced 
requirements  on  the  percentage  of  outside  directors  on  boards  as  well  as  on  the  fraction  of  outside 
directors  on  the  nominating  committee,  compensation  committee,  and  audit  committee  (see  IOSCO 
(2007)).  
Although governance activists have been strong proponents of having more outside directors on 
boards,  the  theoretical  and  empirical  academic  literature  has  been  more  ambiguous.  The  theoretical 
literature points to costs and benefits of having more outside directors on the board. In particular, outside 
directors may have weaker incentives to expend effort, may have higher information acquisition costs, 
and may be more dependent on the CEO for their information (see, e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983), Harris 
and Raviv (2008), and Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008)).
1 Recent empirical papers on the structure 
and role of the board of directors (e.g., Boone et al. (2006), Coles et al. (2008), Duchin et al. (2010), and 
Linck et al. (2008)) have found evidence that firms structure their boards according to their monitoring 
and advising needs and take the costs and benefits of outside directors into account.   
In this paper, we focus on a cost of board independence that has not received attention so far and 
demonstrate that it is economically significant. We show that outside directors have incentives to leave 
when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly and/or disclose adverse 
information. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find empirical evidence that 
                                                 
1 It is therefore possible for firm performance to fall as the board becomes more independent. Though some papers 
find that firm performance increases with board independence (see, for instance, Black and Kim (2008), Aggarwal et 
al. (2009), and Dahya et al. (2008)), other papers find no relation between board independence and performance 
(see, for instance, Bhagat and Black (2002)). 2 
 
this dark side is economically significant and that outside directors are more likely to resign precisely 
when experienced outside directors are most needed.     
Inside and outside directors face different trade-offs when deciding whether to stay on the board 
or resign. An inside director who resigns from the board most likely also has to resign from his job. 
Consequently, an inside director who has doubts about the firm’s future or knows that the firm will reveal 
bad news may find that her best course of action is to stay on the board and work to improve the firm’s 
performance. In contrast, an outside director in the same situation who does not resign faces the risk of 
experiencing  a  loss  of  reputation  as  an  outside  director  when  the  bad  news  breaks.  Such  a  loss  of 
reputation may make it harder for the director to obtain other board seats and perhaps even to keep the 
seats she already has. Furthermore, the director would likely face an increase in her workload as the firm 
undergoes change and restructuring. Researchers have also shown that share price declines are followed 
by an increase in board meetings (see, e.g., Vafeas (1999)). 
Researchers have shown that directors who sit on boards of firms in trouble see their reputations 
tarnished  and  face  consequences  in  their  future  employability  as  directors.  For  example,  Fich  and 
Shivdasani (2007) find that following a financial fraud lawsuit in firms where they are directors, outside 
directors experience a decline in other board seats they hold. Srinivasan (2005) finds that outside directors 
of firms that restate earnings lose reputational capital. Gilson (1990) documents fewer board seats for 
outside directors after having served on boards of companies that experience financial distress, and Coles 
and Hoi (2003) and Harford (2003) show that outside directors have fewer new directorships if the board 
supports actions that are against shareholders’ interests. Further, directors benefit from sitting on boards 
of better performing firms. For example, Yermack (2004) and Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) 
find that directors who sit on the board of better performing firms are more likely to receive additional 
directorships in the future.  
Outside directors are particularly valuable in situations where the firm’s performance is troubled 
since at such times their independence enables them to assess objectively the performance of executives 
and make changes if they are appropriate (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1988)). However, if outside 3 
 
directors have incentives to leave when they expect the firm’s performance to become troubled, the 
usefulness of outside directors is lessened.  
To investigate this dark side of outside directors, we first examine under what circumstances 
outside directors leave firms. Using Cox proportional hazard models, we find that directors are more 
likely to turn over if they are of retirement age (above 70 years old), if the firm had poor stock and 
accounting performance, if there is higher uncertainty, if the firm is larger, and if the CEO left during the 
prior year. This evidence is supportive of the view that outside directors are more likely to quit when the 
firm is performing poorly. However, these findings are not evidence on the reputation cost hypothesis 
since directors who resign because the firm has performed poorly presumably already have suffered the 
reputation loss. A more direct test of the dark side hypothesis is that directors are more likely to quit when 
they expect the firm to perform poorly and to disclose bad news, so that they can at least partly and 
possibly totally escape the reputation loss. A positive relation between director departures and future 
adverse events is consistent with directors quitting the firm to protect themselves.  
To carry out these tests, we focus on unexpected or surprise director departures. Our director 
turnover regressions show that the most significant predictor of director turnover is directors being of 
retirement  age.  We  would  not  expect  future  negative  firm  outcomes  to  be related to these  expected 
director departures. Therefore, we focus on two measures of surprise director departures that are based on 
director characteristics. Most firms have mandatory director retirement ages, and a recent survey shows 
that the average mandatory retirement age is 71.4 years.
2 We define our first measure of surprise outside 
director departures as any outside director turnover prior to the age of 70. Our second measure is based on 
Cox proportional hazard regressions. We carefully specify a model of director turnover using additional 
director characteristics beyond director age, and define an unexpected director departure as a departure 
that happens although the survival function for serving one more year as a director is above 50%.  
                                                 
2 For example, the executive search firm Spencer Stuart reports in their 2009 Spencer Stuart Board Index publication 
(http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2009.pdf) that in 2004, 78% of S&P 500 firms had a 
mandatory retirement policy for outside directors. For these firms, 88% set the mandatory retirement age at 70 or 72.  4 
 
Using these two measures, we find that unexpected director departures are strongly significant in 
our regressions predicting future adverse events. Following surprise director departures, affected firms 
have significantly worse stock and accounting performance, are significantly more likely to suffer from 
an extreme negative return event, are significantly more likely to restate earnings, and have a significantly 
higher likelihood of being named in a federal class action securities fraud lawsuit. These results are also 
economically  significant.  For  example,  the  surprise  departure  of  an  outside  director  increases  the 
probability of an earnings restatement by almost 20% and the probability of being named in a federal 
class  action  securities  fraud  lawsuit  by  35%.  These  results  are  consistent  with  directors  leaving  in 
anticipation of adverse events to protect their reputation or to avoid an increased workload. We also 
examine  whether  directors  leave  unexpectedly  before  poor  merger  decisions,  but  only  find  weak 
evidence.  
One concern with our findings is that it could be that the director is not leaving in anticipation of 
the bad event but that instead it is the director’s departure that causes the event because the firm loses a 
good adviser and/or monitor. This alternative explanation of our findings appears unlikely to be true 
because the period of wrongdoing precedes, for many of our tests, the announcement of the wrongdoing 
by several months. For example, for earnings restatements and litigations the actual misstatement or 
alleged fraud is likely to happen while the director is active on the board.  
There are other reasons that directors could leave unexpectedly. For instance, a director could 
leave because of poor health, or she could leave because she feels powerless to prevent the board from 
taking what she perceives to be bad decisions. Finally, she could be fired. Directors leaving unexpectedly 
because of poor health would weaken our results. Directors who leave because they feel isolated leave 
when they are needed most. Directors who are fired would make our interpretation of the results incorrect. 
We  examine  whether  the  possibility  of  firings  of  directors  is  important  enough  to  undermine  our 
conclusions and find that it is not. First, Yermack (2004) writes that “For outside directors, the threat of 
replacement is more attenuated, since directors do not report to a higher authority that might fire them for 
poor performance.” Second, we would expect that if directors are replaced for poor performance, it is 5 
 
much more likely to be in a situation where the CEO is replaced as well, but our results hold when we 
exclude all observations in which both inside directors and outside directors depart. Third, we support our 
results  by  looking  at  the  subsample  of  directors  that  unexpectedly  leave  one  firm,  but  accept  a 
directorship in a firm from our sample in the two years surrounding their departure. Given that these 
directors have an active labor market, we consider it less likely that they were fired because they are bad 
outside directors. Our reasoning is corroborated by the fact that these outside directors with an active 
labor market leave poorly performing, smaller firms with more risk, and take on directorships in larger 
and more stable firms. When we repeat our analysis of future outcomes on this subsample of directors, we 
find that our results hold qualitatively and quantitatively except for the result on extreme negative stock 
returns.  
There is limited study of the determinants of director turnover and career concerns of outside 
directors.  Yermack  (2004)  finds  that  director  turnover  is  related  to  bad  firm  performance,  which  is 
consistent with the evidence we report. Asthana and Balsam (2007) also find that directors are more likely 
to leave after poor performance, if the firm pays directors poorly, and if the firm is riskier. Brown and 
Maloney  (1999)  document  that  outside  directors  are  more  likely  to  depart  prior  to  bad  acquisitions. 
Agrawal  and  Chen  (2009)  examine  181  director  resignations  between  1994  and  2006  in  which  the 
director resigned amid dispute, filed a letter detailing his reasons for departures, and required that this 
letter be made public. They find a negative stock market reaction to the announcement of these disputes. 
In addition, affected firms have lower performance in the year following the dispute and are statistically 
significantly more likely to delist in the years following the disputed departure. Dewally and Peck (2010) 
analyze  52  announcements  of  director  departures  in  which  the  directors  publicly  announce  their 
resignation and compare these departures with 52 ‘quiet’ director departures. They find that younger 
directors who are active professionals are more likely to announce their departures at poorly performing 
firms. Dewally and Peck (2010) interpret their evidence as consistent with these directors wanting to 
protect their reputation. Bar-Hava and Segal (2010) examine, using a sample of 900 director departures 
between 2004 and 2007, whether directors truthfully state the reason for departure. They classify the 6 
 
stated reasons for departure into four categories, one of which is “disagreement.” They show that all 
categories of director departures are related to an increase in risk of litigation and conclude that not all 
directors truthfully tell why they have left the firm. In contrast to these studies, we are not focused on the 
reasons directors give for their resignations but instead explore whether unexpected resignations predict 
adverse performance and news for firms.   
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  1  introduces  the  sample  and 
databases  we  use.  Section  2  examines  the  determinants  of  director  departures.  We  analyze  the 
performance of firms with outside director departures in Section 3, and examine additional outcome 
variables in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1  Data sources and construction of the sample  
Our  initial  sample  is  formed  by  matching  Standard  and  Poor’s  Compustat  database  with  a 
database of directors obtained from Compact Disclosure. Compact Disclosure provides data on the board 
of  directors  of  publicly  listed  U.S.  firms.  The  raw  sample  consists  of  738,908  director-firm-year 
observations. We follow each director through time from one proxy statement to the next. If a director is 
no longer listed in the subsequent proxy statement, he is defined as having left the board.
 Non-departing 
directors are those who continue to be listed in the subsequent proxy statement. Since we do not have the 
exact date of departure, we define the date of the subsequent proxy statement as the departure or event 
date.
3,4 Our identification of departures depends on comparing adjacent proxy statements, therefore we 
delete observations for which we cannot find any subsequent proxy statements or for which the next 
proxy statement is more than 450 days away. We further require that the firm has asset data and a link for 
CRSP in the fiscal year end just prior to the event date. Firm-years with more than five directors departing 
are deleted as these likely suffer from a corporate control event. We further require that the director is 
                                                 
3 We have checked 30 random director departures and in most cases the actual departure date is announced either a 
few months prior to the proxy date or in the proxy statement itself. Therefore, the departure date we have determined 
is the upper bound on the actual departure date.   
4 For brevity, we also refer to the subsequent proxy date as event date for non-departing directors. 7 
 
neither an inside director nor a former employee of the firm. The final sample consists of 332,327 outside 
director-firm-years (61,137 firm-proxy years) with 90,727 outside directorships, of which 30,421 end 
with a departure while the firm is in our sample. The sample covers 10,513 distinct firms, 64,105 distinct 
directors, and spans the period from 1989 to 2004.  
We  obtain  accounting  data  from  Compustat  and  stock  return  data  from  CRSP.  Compact 
Disclosure is used to obtain information on director characteristics, board characteristics, director and 
officer ownership, and CEO turnover. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level in both 
tails.  
Data on accounting restatements between 1981 and 2006 come from two sources. For the period 
1997  to  2006,  the  data  come  from  the  list  of  restatements  compiled  by  the  U.S.  Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). Prior to that, the data on restatements are hand-collected from a news 
article search in Factiva.
5 Data on firms that have been named in federal class action securities fraud 
lawsuits  come  from  the  Stanford  Law  School  Securities  Class  Action  Clearinghouse 
(securities.stanford.edu). The Clearinghouse maintains an index of filings since the passage of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Finally, SDC Platinum is the data source for announcement 
dates and deal characteristics of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of sample firms.    
 
2  The determinants of director departures  
Table 1 describes summary statistics for our sample. Note that the summary statistics for director 
characteristics in Panel A are at the director-firm-year level and are separated by whether the director is 
departing or not. The firm characteristics in Panel B are at the firm-year level, and are split by whether or 
not there is at least one outside director departure in a firm year.  
Panel A confirms the results of the aforementioned Spencer Stuart Director Study. The typical 
age for a director to step down is between 70 and 72 years. Interestingly, directors seem to be staying on 
                                                 
5 We thank Andy Kim and Helen Zhang for providing us the data on restatements. The restatements data is used and 
described in Meschke and Kim (2010). 8 
 
beyond the age of 65, the typical age for CEOs to step down from active duty (see, e.g., Warner et al. 
(1988), Huson et al. (2001), and Kaplan and Minton (2008)). The average tenure for a departing director 
is slightly less than that of a remaining director (3.95 years versus 4.07 years). Note that the director 
tenure is left censored since we measure director tenure from the date of the firm’s first proxy statement 
in our database that she appears in. Using the Compact Disclosure dataset, we are able to determine 
whether the director is a CEO or non-CEO executive of another firm in our database at the time of the 
event date or departure date. Panel A shows that 3.84% of the departing directors are current CEOs of 
another firm while 6.06% of the non-departing directors are current CEOs. Similarly, departing directors 
are less likely to be current non-CEO executives than non-departing directors.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows that there are more outside director departures in larger and older firms. 
Outside director departures are more frequent in firm-years where accounting and stock returns are poor. 
This fact mirrors results of studies of CEO turnover (e.g., Warner et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Minton 
(2008))  and is  consistent with  the  finding  of  Yermack  (2004)  for  director  departures  in  his  sample. 
Outside director departures are less frequent if the board is relatively small, the proportion of inside 
directors is relatively high, and director and officer ownership is high.  
Table 2 shows results from Cox proportional hazard regressions of the tenure of each outside 
director until her turnover (the event) or until the firm leaves the sample (the censoring event). Column 1 
shows  proportional  hazard  regressions  where  we  include  director  characteristics  only  as  explanatory 
variables, and column 2 adds firm characteristics to the list of covariates. The table reports hazard ratios, 
i.e., exponentiated coefficients. The hazard ratios allow us to quantify the economic magnitude of the 
explanatory  variable.  For  example,  holding  the  other  covariates  constant,  each  additional  board  seat 
reduces the annual hazard of director turnover by 0.895, i.e., 10.50%.
6 By far the largest economic effect 
comes from the age indicator variable equal to one if the director is between 70 and 72 years old. Holding 
                                                 
6 This negative relation between director turnover and board seats is consistent with results by Srinivasan (2005) and 
Asthana and Balsam (2007). 9 
 
the other covariates constant, being between 70 and 72 years old increases the annual hazard of director 
turnover by a factor of 2.398, or 139.80%.  
Column 2 shows that poorer performance, both in terms of ROA and stock returns, increases the 
hazard of director turnover, which is consistent with the results reported by Yermack (2004). Higher 
return volatility increases the hazard of turnover. A large effect is observed whenever the CEO of the firm 
steps down in the previous year, which is consistent with results reported by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988) and Farrell and Whidbee (2000). 
Our subsequent analysis requires a measure of unexpected turnover.  One approach would be to 
collect disclosures of director departures and to evaluate the reasons given by directors for their departure. 
Such an approach does not seem appropriate for this study for at least three reasons. First, firms have only 
been required to disclose director departures systematically in 8-K reports (item 5.02 – Departure of 
Directors or Principal Officers) since August 2004.
7  If we use these disclosures, we would lose much of 
the time-series available to us. Second, Bar-Hava and Segal (2010) argue and provide evidence that 
outside directors have incentives not to disclose the true reasons for their departure in 8-K reports, which 
limits the usefulness of the disclosures. Third, using a newspaper article search to identify disclosures 
about director resignations would pose similar problems. In addition, many director departures are not 
publicly announced in newspapers, and even if they are announced, often no reason for departure is given. 
Hence, we use our empirical analysis of director departures in Table 2 to construct measures of 
unexpected director departures. Since we are interested in departures unrelated to routine retirements, and 
given the very strong effect of the director age (70-72) indicator variable on the turnover hazard, our first 
measure of unexpected turnover is defined as any turnover that happens prior to the director turning 70 
(Surprise departure measure (1)). While this measure is likely to be noisy, it has some appeal because of 
its simplicity. Our second measure is based on the Cox proportional hazard regression in Table 2, column 
1 (Surprise departure measure (2)). For each director-firm-year observation, we calculate the survival 
                                                 
7 Prior to 2004, departures of directors were only disclosed in the 8-K report for departures due to disagreement. 
Disclosure was required only if the departing director explicitly requested that the nature of the disagreement with 
the firm be publicly disclosed. See Agrawal and Chen (2009) and Bar-Hava and Segal (2010) for details.  10 
 
function that  measures  the  probability  that  the  director  will  stay  an  additional  year  on  the  board  of 
directors. If this function is higher than 50%, but the director nevertheless steps down, we classify his 
departure as unexpected. Out of the 30,421 outside director departures, 21,396 departures are classified as 
surprise departures using our first measure while 24,460 departures are classified as surprise departures 
using the second measure. Conditional upon a departure, the correlation between the two measures of 
surprise departures is 0.63.  
 
3  Outside director departures and future performance  
In this section, we analyze whether surprise departures of directors are related to future firm 
performance. We start with stock returns in section 3.1, followed by accounting performance in section 
3.2, and a brief discussion of robustness checks in section 3.3. 
 
3.1  Stock returns 
We analyze stock returns in firms with and without outside director departures using a calendar 
time portfolio approach. Each month, we sort firms into two portfolios based on whether there is at least 
one outside director departure. Firms are added into the assigned portfolio in the month after the departure 
date or event date (when there is no departure) and held for 12 months or until the next proxy date occurs. 
Firm-years with inside director departures are excluded as inside director departures are likely to be 
associated  with  CEO  and  top  executive  turnovers.  Since  our  sample  covers  many  small  firms,  we 
calculate equal-weighted portfolio returns in excess of the 1-month risk-free interest rate. Table 3 shows 
the mean and median return for each portfolio as well as the return to a long-short portfolio in which the 
firms with outside director departures are bought and firms without outside director departures are sold. 
Panel A compares the return of the outside director departure portfolio (Portfolio 1) with the return of the 
no director departure portfolio (Portfolio 2). The portfolio that goes long the firms in which outside 
directors depart and short the firms where no outside directors depart produces a statistically significant 
average (median) monthly return of minus 18 basis points (minus 16 basis points).  11 
 
Panel  B  decomposes  firm-years  with  outside  director  departures  further  into  firm-years  with 
expected and unexpected departures using surprise departure measure (1). We now form three portfolios. 
Portfolio 1S contains firm-years in which there is at least one unexpected outside director departure, while 
portfolio 1E contains firm-years in which all the departures are expected. Portfolio 2 is defined as before. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the negative stock return to the long-short portfolio of Panel A can be 
almost entirely attributed to the portfolio that is formed based on firm-years in which there are surprise 
director departures. The return to the long-short strategy “portfolio 1S – portfolio 2” is minus 23 basis 
points, while the return to the long-short strategy “portfolio 1E – portfolio 2” is an insignificant 4 basis 
points.  
Panel C examines portfolio returns when the sample is split according to outside director surprise 
departure measure (2). The results are statistically and economically very close to the results of Panel B. 
The long-short portfolio that is long firms with surprise outside director departures generates excess 
returns of minus 20 basis points per month, while the average return of the long-short portfolio based on 
expected departures is an insignificant 2 basis point.  
One possible explanation for the performance differences documented in Table 3 is that they are 
driven by differences in the characteristics of the two portfolios. Researchers have identified several 
equity  characteristics  that  explain  differences  in  realized  returns.  In  Table  4,  we  account  for  these 
differences by estimating the four-factor model of Carhart (1997) and Fama and French (1993).  
Panel  A  of  Table  4  indicates  that  the  long-short  portfolio  that  goes  long  firms  with  outside 
director departures and short firms without those departures continues to underperform, even after the 
different characteristics have been taken into account. The estimated monthly alpha of the long-short 
portfolio is minus 18 basis points and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Panel B, in which we use our surprise departure measure (1), shows that firms with surprise 
departures underperform firms without any outside director departures by 20 basis points. Interestingly, 
the factor loadings on the market, size, and value factors indicate that the long-short portfolio is tilted 
towards firms with higher market exposure, smaller firms, and firms with lower valuations.  There is no 12 
 
statistically significant alpha generated by the long-short strategy that buys firms with expected director 
departures.  
Panel C shows results for the long-short strategy using surprise departure measure (2). The long-
short strategy that buys firms in which there are surprise outside director departures and sells firms with 
no outside director departures generates a statistically significant benchmark-adjusted monthly excess 
return of minus 17 basis points. The long-short strategy that uses expected director departures generates 
an insignificant excess return of minus 7 basis points.  
Overall, the results on stock returns indicate that firms in which outside directors unexpectedly 
leave underperform firms with no outside director departures in the 12 months following the departure. 
Agrawal and Chen (2009) find similar results in their sample of 181 firms where directors leave because 
of publicly announced disputes with management. Our results show that the poor stock performance 
extends to a much broader sample of firms that experience director departures.   
 
3.2  Accounting performance 
We now turn to an analysis of accounting performance. Performance is measured using return on 
assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of operating income before depreciation over book value of assets. We 
calculate operating performance pre- and post-director turnover and examine the change in performance 
around the outside director departure. We measure operating performance before the appointment as the 
average over event years -3 to -1, where year -1 is the fiscal year ending just prior to the event date. 
Performance after the director turnover is calculated as the average over event years +1 through +3. The 
change in performance is the difference of the two averages. To control for industry, prior performance, 
and time effects, we calculate a performance and industry-adjusted ROA (see, e.g., Barber and Lyon 
(1996)).
8  We require that the control firms do not have an outside director departure in the same year as 
                                                 
8 Performance and industry-adjusted ROA is the difference between the unadjusted ROA and the ROA of a control 
firm. The control firm is the firm that is from the same two-digit SIC code and has ROA in year -1 that is within +/- 
10% of the firm’s ROA.   13 
 
the departure firm. The ROA is adjusted before averages are taken. Similar to the stock returns analysis, 
we delete firm-years with inside director departures. 
Table  5 shows the  ROA surrounding  the  departures  of outside  directors.  We again  report our 
results in three panels - all departures of outside directors (Panel A), surprise departures using measure (1) 
(Panel B), and surprise departures using measure (2) (Panel C).  
Consistent with the results of Table 2, we see from Table 5, Panel A that firms with outside 
director departures on average underperform industry- and performance-matched firms in the years prior 
to the outside director turnover, even though we have matched firms based on their performance in year -
1.  Panel  A  also  shows  that,  on  average,  raw  performance  and  adjusted  performance  deteriorate 
significantly after the director turnover. The results for changes in performance for the median firm are 
weaker though, with the performance and industry-adjusted change being indistinguishable from zero.  
Panels B and C show results for the change in performance around surprise director departures. It is 
evident  from  these  results  that  the  average  performance  around  surprise  outside  director  departures 
deteriorates after the surprise departure. We can gauge the economic significance by relating the change 
in performance to the pre-turnover ROA. For example, for surprise departure measure (2), the change in 
performance  is  -0.71%.  Relative  to  the  average  pre-turnover  ROA  of  6.27%,  this  is  a  decrease  in 
performance of 11.3%.  
 
3.3  Robustness tests 
In the two analyses in sections 3.1 and 3.2, we exclude all firm-years with departures of at least 
one director who is a current or former employee of the firm (13,545 firm-years are deleted). Including 
departures of inside directors is likely to contaminate the results since they may be due to CEO turnover 
or other top executive departures from the firm. Prior studies have shown that operating performance 
improves  around  forced  CEO  turnover  (Huson  et  al.  (2004))  and  that  CEO  turnover  is  likely  to  be 
preceded by poor stock performance (e.g., Warner et al. (1988)). Since director departures are more likely 
when the CEO leaves, we could be picking up effects of the CEO turnover instead if we were to include 14 
 
these firm-years. In unreported robustness checks, we show that the stock returns to long-short portfolios 
using surprise outside director departures remain quantitatively and qualitatively similar if we include the 
firm-years with inside director departures.   
 
4  Earnings restatements, litigation risk, mergers and acquisitions, and return skewness 
Our results on operating performance are consistent with a scenario in which the outside director 
anticipates deteriorating performance at the firm and leaves to protect her reputation or because she 
anticipates  a significantly  higher  workload.  We  believe  that this interpretation  is the  most  plausible. 
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the outside director departure has a causal effect on firm 
operating performance post departure. Under this hypothesis, the firm loses a talented outside director. 
Without her monitoring and advising capabilities, firm performance deteriorates post-director turnover.  
In  this  section,  we  attempt  to  provide  additional  evidence  that  is  supportive  of  the  former 
reputational concern interpretation. We examine earnings restatements, litigation filings, and mergers and 
acquisitions in the year post-director turnover. These events have been shown to adversely affect the 
reputational capital of directors belonging to the affected firms. Furthermore, they have in common that 
they typically take some time from the initial wrongdoing/planning stage to the public announcement. 
This delay makes a causal interpretation from director departure to event implausible, since directors are 
likely to be still active in the firm at the time of the wrongdoing. For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) 
show summary statistics that the duration of the alleged violation in federal class action lawsuits is, on 
average, over one year (376 days), and that it takes another 100 days until a lawsuit is filed.  Similarly, 
Agrawal and Cooper (2008) document that the average (median) number of days between the first day of 
the quarter restated and the restatement announcement date is over 700 days (500 days). This makes it 
unlikely that any incidence of earnings manipulation is due to the lack of control caused by the departure 
of a good outside director. In fact, the earnings that are being restated after the outside director leaves 
have typically been manipulated while the director was sitting on the board. However, what the director is 15 
 
likely to avoid is being associated with the bad press and shareholder ire following the announcement of 
the earnings restatement.   
 
4.1  Earnings restatements 
We start with a dataset of 3,397 announcements of earnings restatements between 1981 and 2006. 
Data on restatements for the period 1997 to 2006 comes from the list of restatements compiled by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Prior to that, the data on restatements are hand-collected 
from a news article search in Factiva. We match this set of restating firms to our database and require that 
we have complete information on the firm around the restatement date. Figure 1 demonstrates how the 
dataset is being constructed. We check whether there is any outside director departure during period A 
and use this variable to predict the probability of a restatement in period B. Therefore, the main variable 
of interest is an indicator variable which equals one if there is at least one outside director departure 
during period A. The control variables are taken as of the fiscal year ending just prior to Period B. We use 
control variables that have been identified as important in the prior literature (e.g., Larcker, Richardson, 
and Tuna (2007) and Srinivasan (2005)).  
After requiring that there is information on director departures and control variables and that we 
can calculate the abnormal returns during the restatement announcement period, our sample contains 
47,656 firm-years out of which 1,017 are affected by restatements. One third of the sample firm-years 
have at least one outside director departure.   
Table 6 reports the results. The probability of a restatement is significantly positively associated 
with director departures in the prior year.  The effect appears economically significant. The unconditional 
probability of a restatement is 2.13% (1,017/47,656). The coefficient of 0.003 hence signifies that the 
departure of an outside director increases the probability of a restatement by 14%. The effect becomes 
stronger when we use either one of our measures of surprise outside director departures; the coefficient is 
0.004 in columns 2 and 3. A surprise departure of an outside director therefore increases the probability of 
a restatement by 19%.  16 
 
We carry out several robustness checks. Recent research on earnings restatements has suggested 
that not all restatements are material or revise earnings downward (e.g., Hennes et al. (2008)). We are 
interested in restatement events that are material so that they have the potential to adversely affect the 
director’s reputation. Hence, we follow Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008), and focus on restatements 
where the announcement period cumulative abnormal return is less than -1%. We do not tabulate these 
results to conserve space. The announcement period abnormal returns are calculated using the market 
model, estimated over Day -280 to -61, where Day 0 is the announcement date of the restatement. The 
abnormal  returns  are  cumulated  over  Day  -1  to  Day  +1.  There  are  514  restatements  with  negative 
announcement  returns  of  less  than  -1%  in  a  sample  of  47,656  observations.
9  We  estimate  logistic 
regressions similar to the ones in Table 6, but where the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm 
experiences a restatement with abnormal announcement returns less than -1% during the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. Firm-years with restatements that have abnormal announcement returns greater than -1% 
are deleted. The coefficients on the three measures of outside director departures are all 0.002 and all are 
significant at least at the 5% level.  
For  about  42%  of  all  restatements,  the  restatement  announcement  date  is  earlier  than  the 
departure date we have determined for the director. This is inevitable as we need to include the firm-years 
without restatements. Therefore, we cannot simply restrict ourselves to director departures that happen 
prior  to  the  restatement  announcement  date  since  there  are  no  such  dates  for  firm-years  without 
restatements.
10  However,  since  we  are  predicting  restatements  using  director  departures,  to  alleviate 
concerns that the restatement may happen before the director leaves the firm, we have checked that the 
results are not materially affected by excluding such cases. It is important to note that the departure date 
                                                 
9 The average (median) abnormal announcement returns to the 503 restatements with announcement returns greater 
than -1% is 4.7% (2.4%). The average (median) abnormal announcement returns to the 514 restatements with 
announcement returns less than -1% is -10.7% (-6.2%).  
10 We could also predict restatement announcements using departures that happen in earlier proxy statements. But 
since our departure date is already the upper bound, it is unlikely that directors would depart in anticipation of 
events that happen so far ahead.  17 
 
we have determined is the upper bound on the actual departure date, so always excluding these cases 
seems too conservative of a strategy.   
 
4.2   Shareholder litigation  
We use the database on federal class action securities fraud lawsuits provided by the Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse of Stanford Law School and Cornerstone Research to identify instances of 
financial fraud. The database contains a comprehensive list of filings of federal class action securities 
fraud lawsuits filed after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
11 Therefore, the first 
lawsuit is in 1996. We match this database to our main database by ticker symbols. After requiring non-
missing information on director departures and control variables, the sample consists of 28,324 firm-year 
observations with 735 firm-years (2.6%) of alleged securities fraud. The exact timing of the matching 
procedure follows the procedure outlined for earnings restatements in Figure 1.  
A drawback to using class action lawsuits to identify financial fraud is that the class action 
securities fraud lawsuit database contains events where fraud is alleged, but is not actually proven.
12 
However, note that this fact biases us against uncovering evidence of directors leaving for reputational 
concerns  prior  to  filings.  One  fact  that  is  appealing  for  our  purposes  is  that  Black  et  al.  (2006) 
convincingly demonstrate that out-of pocket liability risk from shareholder litigation for outside directors 
is actually extremely low. To the extent that directors worry about future litigation it therefore seems 
much more related to reputational rather than financial concerns.  
Table 7 shows the results of logistic regressions in which the left-hand side variable is equal to 
one if in a given firm-year a federal class action securities fraud lawsuit was filed against the firm, and 
zero otherwise. The main variable of interest is an indicator variable indicating whether there is at least 
one outside director departure prior to the lawsuit filing. About one-third of the firm-years have a director 
                                                 
11 For other research using federal class action securities fraud lawsuits see, e.g., Bajaj et al. (2003), Fich and 
Shivdasani (2007), and Black et al. (2006) and the references therein. 
12 For more details, the reader is referred to Fich and Shivdasani (2007) and Klausner (2010). Klausner (2010) 
empirically analyzes the differences between securities class action lawsuits and actual enforcement actions by the 
SEC.  18 
 
departure.  The  coefficient  on  outside  director  departures  is  highly  statistically  and  economically 
significant. The departure of an outside director increases the probability of the filing of shareholder 
litigation by 0.5%. The economic magnitude of this effect can be gauged by comparing this increase in 
probability relative to the base probability of filing. Relative to the unconditional sample mean probability 
of 2.6%, the coefficient of 0.5% is equivalent to an increase of 19% in the probability of filing. Our finer 
measures that capture surprise departures of directors show even larger effects. The surprise departure of 
an outside director according to measure (1) increases the probability of filing by 0.8/2.6 = 31%. The 
surprise departure of a director using measure (2) increases the probability of filing by 0.9/2.6 = 35%.  
Regarding  the  control  variables,  the  incidence  of  class  action  securities  fraud  lawsuits  is 
increasing in firm size, if stock and accounting returns were poor the prior year, and if the firm raised 
relatively  more  external financing  in the  prior  year.   These findings  are  consistent  with research  on 
shareholder lawsuits that has shown that firms are more likely to be sued if they are larger and had poorer 
returns in the prior year (see, for instance, Choi (2003)). Further, investors can sue firms that issued 
securities on various grounds.  
For  about  30%  of  our  litigations,  the  filing  date  is  earlier  than  the  departure  date  we  have 
determined for the director. In untabulated robustness tests, we deleted these cases since we are predicting 
litigation using director departures, so as to alleviate concerns that the litigation filing may happen before 
the director leaves the firm. Our results remain similar, with the coefficients being 0.003 (significant at 
the 5% level) for the first specification, and 0.005 (significant at the 1% level) for both the second and 
third specifications.  
 
4.3  Mergers and acquisitions  
We now examine whether the incidence of value-destroying mergers and acquisitions is higher 
after outside directors unexpectedly left and analyze both cumulative abnormal announcement returns and 
dollar changes around the event. Outside directors may choose to leave instead of trying to discipline 
managers when management is considering value-destroying acquisitions. We only include completed 19 
 
deals for domestic targets where the transaction value is at least one million dollars and at least 1% of the 
acquirer’s market value prior to the announcement date. Deals where the effective date is more than 1,000 
days away from the announcement date are also deleted. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns of 
the  acquirer  over  the  event  window  (-1  day,  +1  day),  where  day  0  is  the  announcement  date.  The 
abnormal returns are calculated based on a market model, where the parameters of the market model are 
estimated using data from days -280 to -61. We also calculate the change in acquirer market capitalization 
from Day -2 to Day +1 in 2008 million dollars. The main variable of interest is an indicator which equals 
one if there is at least one outside director who departs in the 12 months prior to the announcement date. 
The control variables are similar to those used in prior studies on mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005)). The final sample consists of 4,697 M&A deals; 40% of the deals are 
associated with an outside director departure prior to the announcement date. 
Table 8 shows the results. Panel A analyzes cumulative abnormal announcement returns while 
Panel B analyzes dollar changes. There is little evidence in Panel A of Table 8 that outside director 
departures  are  related  to  negative  merger  and  acquisition  announcement  returns.  The  other  control 
variables  have  coefficients  that  are  consistent  with  the  results  of  prior  research  (e.g.,  Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005)). 
Panel  B  shows  the  change  in  acquirer  market  value  around  the  merger,  and  contains  some 
evidence  that  surprise  outside  director  departures,  when  measured  with  the  more  complex  surprise 
departure measure (2), are associated with lower dollar changes of mergers and acquisitions. The surprise 
departure of an outside director in the year prior to the merger is associated with a dollar return that is 
approximately $80 million lower.  
 
4.4  Skewness 
Outside directors are likely to worry in particular about actions that could result in large, negative 
shocks to firm value. We explicitly examined three events that could lead to such a destruction of firm 
value in sections 4.1 to 4.3, but there could of course be other corporate or managerial actions that have 20 
 
the potential to harm shareholders and to damage the reputation of directors. We now take a more indirect 
approach and analyze whether extreme negative stock returns are more frequent in periods following the 
departure of outside directors. We define extreme negative returns as follows. A monthly return is defined 
as extreme if it is at least 3 standard deviations away from the past 24 months average. We start with the 
61,137 firm-years in the director departure dataset. We define a firm-year to be an extreme negative 
return firm-year if at least one of the 12 monthly returns following the proxy date or director’s departure 
is classified as extreme. We report results where we define returns using the logarithm of price changes, 
although results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar if we use simple returns instead.  
We follow Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and control for the market capitalization, prior stock 
performance, stock volatility, and stock turnover. Specifically, we include as control variables the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization in the month of the proxy date or director’s departure date (the event 
date), the average monthly return over the 12 months ending in the month of the event date, the average 
monthly standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 12 months ending in the month of the event 
date, and the average monthly share turnover over the prior 12 months. Turnover is defined as shares 
traded divided by shares outstanding. Since turnover data for Nasdaq is not comparable with that of 
NYSE and AMEX stocks, we define a turnover variable for the Nasdaq stocks and another turnover 
variable for the NYSE/AMEX stocks.
13 The turnover variable for Nasdaq (NYSE/AMEX) stocks is set to 
zero for NYSE/AMEX (Nasdaq) stocks. After requiring non-missing information for control firms, our 
sample contains 60,460 firm-years, with 12.1% of those firm-years exhibiting extreme negative returns. 
Table 9 shows the results. In column 1, we find that extreme negative stock returns are more 
likely to follow director departures. In columns 2 and 3 where we focus on surprise departures, the results 
appear much stronger. Surprise outside director departures are strongly related to extreme negative returns 
in  the  year  following  the  director  departure.  The  effect  is  economically  meaningful.  The  surprise 
departure of at least one outside director increases the probability of a large negative return event by 0.9% 
- 1.1%, or, relative to the sample mean of 12.1%, by approximately 7.4% - 9.1%.  
                                                 
13 For details, please see Atkins and Dyl (1997). 21 
 
The coefficients on the control variables suggest that larger firms, firms that experienced positive 
returns in the past, firms with lower stock return volatility, and Nasdaq firms with high turnover are more 
likely to experience an extreme negative stock return event. This is similar to Chen, Hong, and Stein 
(2001) who examine daily stock return skewness for a sample of NYSE/AMEX firms. They find that 
bigger firms, firms with higher stock returns in the past, and firms that experienced a surge in turnover are 
more crash-prone.    
 
4.5  Additional robustness tests 
In all tests of this section, we have used indicator variables equal to one if outside directors 
departed, and zero otherwise. We have neglected the concurrent departure of inside directors because the 
purpose of our study is an analysis of the reputational concerns of outside directors. We have verified that 
alternative treatments of firm-years in which both outside and inside directors depart does not materially 
affect our conclusions. First, we have re-estimated all regressions including an indicator variable equal to 
one if an inside director departed in a firm-year, and zero otherwise.
14 The coefficients obtained on the 
outside director departure indicator variables from those regressions are quantitatively and qualitatively 
similar to the coefficients reported in Tables 6 to 9.  
Second, we have re-estimated the regressions of Tables 6 to 9 by excluding firm-years in which at 
least one inside director departs to focus on years in which only outside directors leave. The results on 
shareholder litigation and skewness remain unaffected; results on earnings restatement become weaker 
(only  the  specification  using  surprise  departure  measure  (2)  is  relevant)  and  the  dollar  change 
specifications on mergers and acquisitions become much stronger (all three director departure measures 
become relevant and the dollar change becomes more negative).  
                                                 
14 Out of 39,711 firm-years without any outside director departures, 7,844 (19.6%) firm-years have at least one 
inside director departure. In contrast, out of 21,426 firm-years with at least one outside director departures, 5,701 
(26.61%) have at least one inside director departure. The correlation between an indicator variable for outside 
director departure and inside director departure is 7.9%. Similar numbers are obtained if we examine the surprise 
departure measures for outside directors. 22 
 
One concern regarding the interpretation of our results is that directors may not voluntarily leave 
the firm to protect their reputation, but are fired from the board. As explained in the introduction, we 
believe  that  this  interpretation  is  unlikely.  Nevertheless,  we  support  our  results  by  looking  at  the 
subsample of directors that unexpectedly leave one firm, but add a new board seat from a different firm in 
our sample in the same year. There are approximately 1,500 such outside director departures from 1,400 
firm-years. Given that these directors have an active labor market, we consider it less likely that they were 
fired as outside directors because they were bad directors. Our reasoning is corroborated by (unreported) 
comparisons of the characteristics of firms that the outside directors drop and those that the directors add. 
Outside directors tend to trade up, that is they leave boards of poorly performing, smaller firms with more 
risk and take on board seats in larger and more stable firms. We have re-estimated all regressions reported 
in Tables 6 through 9 by substituting our outside director surprise departure variables with indicator 
variables for surprise outside director departures of directors with an active labor market. The results we 
report in Tables 6, 7, and 8 hold qualitatively and quantitatively using this smaller sample of surprise 
outside director departures with an active labor market. The results in Table 9 hold qualitatively, but 
become statistically insignificant. 
 
5  Conclusion  
In  this  paper,  we  show that  there  is a  dark  side  to  outside  directors.  Outside  directors  have 
incentives to quit to protect their reputation or to avoid increases in their workload when the firm on 
whose board they sit is likely to experience a tough time either because of poor performance or because of 
disclosure of adverse actions. Our evidence shows that following surprise outside director departures, 
affected firms have worse stock performance, worse accounting performance, a greater likelihood of an 
extreme negative return, a greater likelihood of a restatement, and a greater likelihood of being sued by 
their shareholders. These results provide further evidence that increasing board independence has costs as 
well as benefits. Further research should investigate whether different types of outside directors are more 
prone to resigning to protect their reputation and whether the capital markets react differently to the 23 
 
appointment  of  such  directors.  Another  useful  topic  of  research  would  be  to  analyze  the  impact  of 
different types of compensation schemes on directors’ incentives to quit to protect their reputation.  24 
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Fiscal year  
end date 
Fiscal year  
start date 
Period B: 
Did restatement happen during the fiscal year? 
Period A: 
Did outside director leave during this period? 28 
 
Table 1.  Summary statistics  
The sample consists of 332,327 outside director-firm-years (61,137 firm-years) in publicly listed U.S. firms. Only 
outside directors are included; directors who are current and former employees of the firm are excluded. Panel A 
shows director characteristics, split by whether the director departed in any given year or not. The statistics in Panel 
A are at the director-firm-year level. Panel B  shows  firm characteristics, split by  whether at least one outside 
director departed in a given firm-year. The statistics in Panel B are at the firm-year level. Accounting data is from 
Compustat, stock return data from CRSP, and data on director characteristics and governance is from Compact 
Disclosure. The accounting data is taken from Year -1, where Year -1 is defined as the fiscal year ending just prior 
to the event date. Stock returns are buy-and-hold returns over the fiscal year ending just prior to the event date. 
Return volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year ending just prior to the event date. The 
corporate governance data is taken as of the proxy statement prior to the event date. Dollar values are expressed in 
2008 million dollars. Two-sample t-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test whether the means 
(medians) of departure years are significantly different from non-departure years. Statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Director characteristics 
     
  Non-departing directors  Departing directors 
  (N=301,906)  (N=30,421) 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Age indicator (64-66) (%)  11.60    7.42***   
Age indicator (67-69) (%)  10.28    8.16***   
Age indicator (70-72) (%)  6.08    15.59***   
Age indicator (above 72) (%)  6.91    13.12***   
Tenure (years)  4.07  3.01  3.95***  2.99*** 
Current CEO (%)  6.06    3.84***   
Former CEO (%)  7.57    7.97**   
Current executive (%)  5.22    3.47***   
Former executive (%)  10.08    9.26***   
No. of other directorships  0.82  0.00  0.60***  0.00*** 
         
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
         
  Non-departure years  Departure years 
  (N=39,711)  (N=21,426) 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Book assets   1986.53  209.76  3918.24***  347.02*** 
Market cap  1333.29  158.22  2126.33***  231.16*** 
Sales  1196.87  178.00  2025.71***  256.48*** 
Firm age (years)  15.93  10.00  18.22***  11.00*** 
Return on assets (ROA) (%)  8.58  11.42  5.15***  9.42*** 
Stock return (%)  20.24  7.62  14.90***  4.49*** 
Return volatility (%)  3.82  3.31  3.84  3.20*** 
Board size  7.68  7.00  9.36***  9.00*** 
Proportion of inside directors (%)  32.79  28.57  25.75***  22.22*** 
D&O ownership (%)  24.73  18.82  20.24***  13.20*** 29 
 
Table 2. Cox proportional hazard regressions of director turnover 
The table reports results from a Cox proportional hazard model. The sample consists of 332,327 outside director-
firm-years, which track 90,727 directorships. Only outside directors are included; directors who are current and 
former employees of the firm are excluded.  The time variable is director tenure in years until turnover (the event) or 
until the firm quits the sample. The status or event variable is outside director turnover. Of the 90,727 directors, 
30,421 directors depart during our sample (experience the event); all other outside director tenures are treated as 
right-censored in the regressions. The accounting data are taken from year -1, where year -1 is defined as the fiscal 
year ending just prior to the date the time variable is measured. Stock returns are buy-and-hold returns over year -1. 
Return volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns over year -1. The corporate governance data are taken as 
of the proxy statement prior to the date the time variable is measured. Age indicator variables are indicator variables 
equal to one if the director age falls within the specified range, and zero otherwise. CEO left indicator is an indicator 
variable  equal  to  one  if  the  CEO  turned  over  during  the  past  12  months.    The  table  reports  hazard  ratios 
(exponentiated coefficients). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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   (1)  (2) 
No. of other directorships  0.895***  0.901*** 
  (-18.66)  (-16.27) 
Age indicator (64-66)  0.743***  0.771*** 
  (-13.30)  (-10.85) 
Age indicator (67-69)  0.891***  0.933** 
  (-5.38)  (-3.01) 
Age indicator (70-72)  2.398***  2.572*** 
  (54.52)  (54.32) 
Age indicator (above 72)  1.761***  1.871*** 
  (32.99)  (33.09) 
Current CEO director  0.870***  0.877*** 
  (-4.44)  (-3.90) 
Former CEO director  1.167***  1.121*** 
  (7.18)  (4.95) 
Current executive director  0.832***  0.828*** 
  (-5.76)  -(5.55) 
Former executive director   0.98  0.915*** 
  (-1.03)  (-4.13) 
Log (sales)    1.035*** 
    (7.94) 
Log (firm age)    0.826*** 
    (-19.18) 
Stock return    0.958*** 
    (-4.64) 
Return on assets    0.529*** 
    (-17.11) 
Return volatility    1.096*** 
    (29.21) 
CEO left indicator    1.172*** 
    (8.52) 
Board size    1.02*** 
    (12.30) 
Proportion of inside directors    0.650*** 
    (-8.56) 
D&O ownership (%)    0.998*** 
    (-4.72) 
Number of subjects  90,285  80,666 
Number of turnovers  30,013  26,121 
Number of observations  331,834  287,558 
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Table 3. Univariate analysis of portfolio returns 
The table shows an analysis of stock returns in excess of the risk-free interest rate for different portfolios formed 
based on outside director departures. The analysis is based on 61,137 firm-years in the director departure dataset. 
Firm-years are excluded if there is at least one departure of a director who is a current or former employee of the 
firm, which reduces the sample to 47,592 firm-years. In Panel A, firms are sorted into two portfolios based on 
whether there is at least one outside director departure or not and are held in the portfolio for the subsequent 12 
months. Portfolio 1 consists of firms where at least one outside director departs, and Portfolio 2 contains firms 
where  there  are  no  outside  director  departures.  In  Panels  B  and  C,  we  split  the  portfolio  of  outside  director 
departures into portfolio 1S, consisting of  firms  with at  least one  surprise director departure and portfolio 1E, 
consisting of  firms  where all director departures are expected. Panel B defines expected director departures as 
departures of directors age 70 and above and treats departures of directors age 69 and below as surprise departures. 
Panel C defines surprise director departures as departures in which the director survival function from the Cox 
proportional hazard model in Table 2, Column 1 is higher than 50%, but the director nevertheless departs. The table 
shows the monthly equal-weighted portfolio excess returns, where the excess returns are calculated by subtracting 
from the equal-weighted portfolio returns the risk-free rate taken from the Fama-French monthly factor dataset. t-
tests and signed rank tests are used to test whether the mean and median monthly returns are significantly different 
from zero. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
   Equally-weighted portfolio ret 
  Mean  Median 
         
Panel A: Outside director departure         
Outside dir depart (Portfolio = 1)  0.0077  **  0.0123  *** 
No dir depart (Portfolio = 2)  0.0095  ***  0.0148  *** 
Portfolio 1 - Portfolio 2  -0.0018  ***  -0.0016  *** 
         
Panel B: Outside director surprise departure (1)       
Outside dir surprise depart (Portfolio = 1S)  0.0072  *  0.0118  ** 
Outside dir expected depart (Portfolio = 1E)  0.0091  ***  0.0120  *** 
No dir depart (Portfolio = 2)  0.0095  ***  0.0148  *** 
Portfolio 1S - Portfolio 2  -0.0023  ***  -0.0023  *** 
Portfolio 1E - Portfolio 2  -0.0004    -0.0002   
         
Panel C: Outside director surprise departure (2)       
Outside dir surprise depart (Portfolio = 1S)  0.0075  **  0.0113  ** 
Outside dir expected depart (Portfolio = 1E)  0.0107  ***  0.0120  *** 
No dir depart (Portfolio = 2)  0.0095  ***  0.0148  *** 
Portfolio 1S - Portfolio 2  -0.0020  ***  -0.0023  *** 
Portfolio 1E - Portfolio 2  -0.0002    -0.0013   





Table 4. Monthly performance attribution regressions 
The table shows results of calendar-time portfolio performance attribution regressions. The analysis is based on 
61,137 firm-years in the director departure dataset. Firm-years are excluded if there is at least one departure of a 
director who is a current or former employee of the firm, which reduces the sample to 47,592 firm-years. In Panel A, 
firms are sorted into two portfolios based on whether there is at least one outside director departure or not and held 
in the portfolio for the subsequent 12 months. Portfolio 1 consists of firms where at least one outside director 
departs, and Portfolio 2 contains firms where there are no outside director departures. In Panels B and C, we split the 
portfolio of director departures into portfolio 1S of surprise director departures and portfolio 1E of expected director 
departures. Panel B defines expected director departures as departures of directors age 70 and above and treats 
departures of directors age 69 and below as surprise departures. If in a given firm-year, there is both a surprise 
departure and an expected departure, we assign the firm-year to the surprise departure portfolio. Panel C defines 
surprise  director  departures  as  departures  in  which  the  one-year  outside  director  survival  function  of  the  Cox 
proportional hazard model in Table 2, Column 1 is higher than 50%, but the director nevertheless departs. The table 
reports coefficient estimates from regressions based on a four- factor performance attribution model for the equal-
weighted monthly excess returns of the various portfolios. The four factors are defined in Fama and French (1993) 
and Carhart (1997). The factors are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market (MKTRF), 
size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and momentum (UMD) effects, respectively. Standard errors are reported in 








   Intercept  MKTRF  SMB  HML  UMD 
                     
Panel A: Outside director departure               
Outside dir depart  
(Portfolio = 1) 
0.0020  *  0.9542  ***  0.6794  ***  0.2978  ***  -0.2285  *** 
0.0010    0.0267    0.0285    0.0354    0.0205   
No dir depart       
(Portfolio = 2) 
0.0038  ***  0.9049  ***  0.7288  ***  0.2894  ***  -0.1989  *** 
0.0010    0.0255    0.0272    0.0338    0.0196   
Portfolio 1 - Portfolio 2  -0.0018  ***  0.0493  ***  -0.0494  ***  0.0084    -0.0295  ** 
0.0006    0.0157    0.0167    0.0208    0.0120   
                     
Panel B: Outside director surprise departure (1)               
Outside dir surprise depart 
(Portfolio = 1S) 
0.0018    0.9733  ***  0.7646  ***  0.2265  ***  -0.2598  *** 
0.0012    0.0323    0.0344    0.0427    0.0247   
Outside dir expected 
depart (Portfolio = 1E) 
0.0026  ***  0.8878  ***  0.4470  ***  0.4669  ***  -0.1316  *** 
0.0010    0.0268    0.0286    0.0355    0.0206   
No dir depart          
(Portfolio = 2) 
0.0038  ***  0.9049  ***  0.7288  ***  0.2894  ***  -0.1989  *** 
0.0010    0.0255    0.0272    0.0338    0.0196   
Portfolio 1S - Portfolio 2  -0.0020  ***  0.0684  ***  0.0359  *  -0.0628  **  -0.0609  *** 
0.0007    0.0198    0.0211    0.0262    0.0152   
Portfolio 1E - Portfolio 2  -0.0011    -0.0171    -0.2818  ***  0.1775  ***  0.0673  *** 
0.0010    0.0277    0.0295    0.0367    0.0213   
                     
Panel C: Outside director surprise departure (2)               
Outside dir surprise depart 
(Portfolio = 1S) 
0.0018    0.9713  ***  0.7480  ***  0.2480  ***  -0.2517  *** 
0.0012    0.0330    0.0346    0.0429    0.0245   
Outside dir expected 
depart (Portfolio = 1E) 
0.0028    0.8800  ***  0.4615  ***  0.4992  ***  -0.1534  *** 
0.0020    0.0537    0.0562    0.0697    0.0398   
No dir depart          
(Portfolio = 2) 
0.0035  ***  0.9015  ***  0.7318  ***  0.2946  ***  -0.2033  *** 
0.0010    0.0272    0.0284    0.0353    0.0201   
Portfolio 1S - Portfolio 2  -0.0017  **  0.0698  ***  0.0161    -0.0466  *  -0.0485  *** 
0.0007    0.0199    0.0208    0.0258    0.0147   
Portfolio 1E - Portfolio 2  -0.0007    -0.0215    -0.2703  ***  0.2046  ***  0.0498   
0.0020    0.0541    0.0566    0.0702    0.0400   




Table 5. Operating performance around director departures 
The table reports firm operating performance around director departures. The analysis is based on 61,137 firm-years 
in the director departure dataset. Firm-years are excluded if there is at least one departure of a director who is a 
current or former employee of the firm, resulting in 47,592 firm-years. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the 
ratio of operating income before depreciation to book assets. Performance, industry-adjusted ROA is the difference 
between the unadjusted ROA and the ROA of a control firm. The control firm is the firm that is from the same two-
digit SIC code and has ROA in year -1 that is within +/- 10% of the firm’s ROA, where year -1 is the fiscal year end 
just prior to the director’s departure date. We require that the control firms not have an outside director departure in 
year 0. ROA is averaged before and after the event. In Panels B and C, we split director departures into surprise 
director  departures  and  expected  director  departures.  Surprise  departure  (1)  is  defined  as  all  outside  director 
departures of directors age 69 and below. Surprise departure (2) is defined as all outside director departures in which 
the one-year outside director survival function from the Cox proportional hazard model in Table 2, Column 1 is 
higher than 50%, but the director nevertheless departs. t-Tests and signed rank tests are used to determine whether 
the means and medians are significantly different from zero. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
Panel A: All outside director departures 
 
   Mean  Median 
   ROA 
Before (-3,-1)  0.0726  ***  0.1080  *** 
After (+1,+3)  0.0650  ***  0.1000  *** 
Change  -0.0075  ***  -0.0031  *** 
         
  Performance, industry-adjusted ROA 
Before (-3,-1)  -0.0033  ***  0.0003    
After (+1,+3)  -0.0073  ***  0.0003    
Change  -0.0039  ***  0.0003    
              
 
Panel B: Outside director surprise departures (1) 
 
   Mean  Median 
  ROA 
Before (-3,-1)  0.0596  ***  0.1025  *** 
After (+1,+3)  0.0534  ***  0.0948  *** 
Change   -0.0062  ***  -0.0031  *** 
         
  Performance, industry-adjusted ROA 
Before (-3,-1)  -0.0046  ***  0.0003    
After (+1,+3)  -0.0104  ***  -0.0001  *** 
Change  -0.0058  ***  0.0002  * 





Panel C: Outside director surprise departures (2) 
 
   Mean  Median 
  ROA 
Before (-3,-1)  0.0627  ***  0.1017  *** 
After (+1,+3)  0.0556  ***  0.0937  *** 
Change   -0.0071  ***  -0.0031  *** 
         
  Performance, industry-adjusted ROA 
Before (-3,-1)  -0.0041  ***  0.0003    
After (+1,+3)  -0.0100  ***  -0.0002  *** 
Change  -0.0060  ***  -0.0001  ** 




Table 6. Outside director departures and subsequent earnings restatements 
The table shows results from logistic regressions of a subsequent earnings restatement announcement following 
outside  director  departures.  Announcement  dates  of  restatements  from  1997  onwards  are  from  the  list  of 
restatements compiled by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Prior to that, the data on restatements 
are hand-collected from a news article search in Factiva. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one 
if there is a restatement announcement during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Outside dir depart indicator is 
equal to one if there is at least one outside director departure in the year prior to the fiscal year in which earnings are 
restated.  Surprise outside director departure (1) is an indicator variable which equals one if there is at least one 
departure of an outside director age 69 and below. Surprise outside director departure (2) is an indicator variable 
which equals one if there is at least one departure of an outside director whose survival function from the Cox 
proportional hazard model in Table 2, Column 1 is higher than 50%, but the director nevertheless departs. The 
accounting data is taken from the fiscal year end just prior to the restatement. Cash flow is equal to the sum of net 
income before extraordinary items and depreciation divided by book assets. External financing is equal to the sum of 
net equity financing and net debt financing divided by book assets. Cash acquisition is the ratio of cash spent on 
acquisitions to book assets. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in italics. Intercepts are not 
reported. Marginal effects and their corresponding standard errors are provided. Statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Outside dir depart indicator  0.003**     
  0.001     
Outside dir surprise depart (1)    0.004***   
    0.001   
Outside dir surprise depart (2)      0.004*** 
      0.001 
Board size  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Proportion of outside directors  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  0.003  0.003  0.003 
Log (Sales)  0.004***  0.004***  0.004*** 
  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Stock return  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Cash flow  -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.013*** 
  0.003  0.003  0.003 
External financing  0.004  0.004  0.004 
  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Cash acquisitions  0.013**  0.012**  0.012** 
  0.006  0.006  0.006 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.07  0.07  0.07 
N  47,656  47,656  47,651 






Table 7. Outside director departures and subsequent federal class action securities fraud lawsuit 
filings 
The table shows results from logistic regressions of the filing of a federal class action securities fraud lawsuit 
following outside director departures. Data on firms that have been named in federal class action securities fraud 
lawsuits come from the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse. The dependent variable is an 
indicator variable equal to one if there is a lawsuit filing during the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Outside dir 
depart indicator is equal to one if there is at least one outside director departure in the year prior to the fiscal year in 
which the lawsuit is filed.  Surprise outside director departure (1) is an indicator variable which equals one if there is 
at least one departure of an outside director age 69 and below. Surprise outside director departure (2) is an indicator 
variable which equals one if there is at least one departure of an outside director whose survival function from the 
Cox proportional hazard model in Table 2, Column 1 is higher than 50%, but the director nevertheless departs. The 
accounting data is taken from the fiscal year end just prior to the lawsuit event. External financing is equal to the 
sum of net equity financing and net debt financing divided by book assets. Standard errors clustered at the firm level 
are reported in italics. Intercepts are not reported. Marginal effects and their corresponding standard errors are 
provided. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Outside dir depart indicator  0.005***     
  0.002     
Outside dir surprise depart (1)     0.008***   
    0.002   
Outside dir surprise depart (2)       0.009*** 
      0.002 
Board size  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Proportion of outside directors  0.006  0.005  0.005 
  0.005  0.005  0.005 
Log (sales)  0.006***  0.006***  0.006*** 
  0.001  0.001  0.000 
Stock return  -0.003**  -0.003**  -0.003** 
  0.001  0.001  0.001 
ROA  -0.009*  -0.009*  -0.008* 
  0.005  0.005  0.005 
External financing  0.031***  0.031***  0.031*** 
  0.003  0.003  0.003 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.06  0.06  0.06 
N  28,324  28,324  28,320 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 38 
 
Table 8. Outside director departures and subsequent merger and acquisition profitability 
The table examines the profitability of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) following outside director departures.  The 
M&A deals are from SDC Platinum. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal announcement 
return to M&A activities of sample firms. The cumulative abnormal announcement returns are measured over the 
event window (-1 day, +1 day), where day 0 is the announcement date. The abnormal returns are calculated from a 
market model, where the parameters of the market model are estimated using the CRSP equal-weighted market 
returns  and  data  from  days  -280  to  -61.  In  Panel  B,  the  dependent  variable  is  the  change  in  acquirer  market 
capitalization from day -2 to day +1, in millions of 2008 dollars. Outside dir depart indicator is equal to one if there 
is at least one outside director departure in the 12 months prior to the deal announcement date.  Surprise outside 
director departure (1) is an indicator variable which equals one if there is at least one departure of an outside director 
age 69 and below. Surprise outside director departure (2) is an indicator variable which equals one if there is at least 
one departure of an outside director whose survival function from the Cox proportional hazard model in Table 2, 
Column 1 is higher than 50%, but the director nevertheless departs. The accounting data are from the fiscal year end 
just prior to the announcement. Deal characteristics are from SDC Platinum. Robust standard errors are reported in 
italics. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Panel A: Cumulative abnormal announcement returns  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Outside dir depart indicator  0.002     
  0.003     
Outside dir surprise depart (1)     0.005   
    0.003   
Outside dir surprise depart (2)       0.004 
      0.003 
Board size  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Proportion of outside directors  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011 
  0.008  0.008  0.008 
Log(assets)  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005*** 
  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Book leverage  -0.010  -0.011  -0.011 
  0.011  0.011  0.011 
Tobin's Q  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Private target indicator  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  0.005  0.005  0.005 
Public target indicator  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.033*** 
  0.005  0.005  0.005 
Same industry indicator  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
  0.003  0.003  0.003 
Tender offer indicator  0.020***  0.020***  0.020*** 
  0.005  0.005  0.005 
Hostile deal indicator  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004 
  0.011  0.011  0.011 
Competed deal indicator  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  0.010  0.010  0.010 
100% cash payment indicator  0.012***  0.012***  0.012*** 
  0.004  0.004  0.004 
100% stock payment indicator  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002 
  0.004  0.004  0.004 
Cash flow / assets  -0.021  -0.020  -0.020 
  0.016  0.016  0.016 
Transaction value / acq market value  0.017**  0.017**  0.017** 
  0.007  0.007  0.007 
N  4,697  4,697  4,696 
Adj R-Sq  0.09  0.09  0.09 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 40 
 
Panel B: Change in acquirer market capitalization  
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Outside dir depart indicator  -35.019     
  39.494     
Outside dir surprise depart (1)    -42.824   
    44.285   
Outside dir surprise depart (2)       -79.874* 
      46.777 
Board size  -9.141  -9.224  -9.070 
  6.886  6.953  6.885 
Proportion of outside directors  -27.603  -28.138  -19.053 
  79.002  75.736  79.695 
Log(Assets)  -87.448***  -87.992***  -88.340*** 
  20.022  20.170  20.238 
Book leverage  141.566  143.253  145.762 
  119.236  119.350  119.304 
Tobin's Q  -70.144**  -69.954**  -70.162** 
  32.331  32.257  32.254 
Private target indicator  -38.491  -37.821  -37.581 
  29.877  29.940  29.934 
Public target indicator  -129.640***  -129.257***  -129.026*** 
  36.654  36.605  36.635 
Same industry indicator  50.934  50.950  50.376 
  47.765  47.719  47.738 
Tender offer indicator  160.419*  161.920*  160.894* 
  86.868  86.927  86.918 
Hostile deal indicator  -643.865  -648.332  -644.263 
  525.805  524.640  525.022 
Competed deal indicator  -140.741  -143.218  -148.218 
  191.484  191.785  191.684 
100% Cash payment indicator  28.647  27.850  27.931 
  33.277  33.136  33.243 
100% Stock payment indicator  -16.721  -16.912  -16.624 
  43.625  43.623  43.572 
Cash flow / assets  -40.881  -41.250  -46.380 
  97.289  95.339  97.909 
Transaction value / Acq market value  -53.451***  -53.717***  -52.917*** 
  19.398  19.596  19.342 
N  4,697  4,697  4,696 
Adj R-Sq  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 9. Outside director departures and subsequent extreme negative stock returns 
The  table  shows  results  from  logistic  regressions  of  extreme  negative  stock  returns  following  outside  director 
departures. The analysis is based on 61,137 firm-years in the director departure dataset. The dependent variable is 
equal to one if in any of the 12 months following the proxy date or director departure date the monthly return is 
three standard deviations below the average monthly return over the past two years. Outside dir depart indicator is 
equal to one if there is at least one outside director departure. Surprise outside director departure (1) is an indicator 
variable which equals one if there is at least one departure of an outside director age 69 and below. Surprise outside 
director departure (2) is an indicator variable which equals one if there is at least one departure of an outside director 
whose survival function from the Cox proportional hazard model in Table 2, Column 1 is higher than 50%, but the 
director  nevertheless  departs.  Average  monthly  stock  return  is  the  average  of  monthly  stock  returns  from  the 
previous  12  months,  ending  in  the  month  of  the  departure  date  or  event  date.  Average  stock  return  standard 
deviation is the average of the monthly standard deviation of daily stock returns. Log(Market capitalization) is the 
natural logarithmic transformation of market capitalization measured at the date of director turnover, in millions of 
2008 dollars. Average turnover is the average of monthly stock turnover, where turnover is defined as shares traded 
divided by shares outstanding. NYSE (Nasdaq) turnover is set to zero for all Nasdaq (NYSE and AMEX) firms. 
Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in italics. Intercepts are not reported. Marginal effects and 
their corresponding standard errors are provided. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated 
by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Outside dir depart indicator  0.005*     
  0.003     
Outside dir surprise depart (1)     0.011***   
    0.003   
Outside dir surprise depart (2)       0.009*** 
      0.003 
Board size  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Proportion of outside directors  0.004  0.002  0.002 
  0.007  0.007  0.007 
Log (Market capitalization)  0.002**  0.002***  0.002*** 
  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Average monthly return  0.244***  0.245***  0.245*** 
  0.032  0.031  0.031 
Average stock return standard deviation  -1.088***  -1.114***  -1.105*** 
  0.095  0.095  0.095 
Average turnover (NYSE, AMEX)  0.009  0.007  0.008 
  0.034  0.034  0.034 
Average turnover (Nasdaq)  0.060***  0.058***  0.059*** 
  0.013  0.013  0.013 
Pseudo R-Sq  0.06  0.06  0.06 
N  60,460  60,460  60,441 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 